We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities. To define it we generalize the concept of marginal contribution by using a lattice structure on the set of embedded coalitions. The family of lattice structure values is characterized by extensions of Shapley's axioms: efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and the null player property. The first three axioms have widely accepted generalizations to the framework of games with externalities. However, different concepts of null players have been proposed in the literature and we contribute to this debate with a new one. The null player property that we use is weaker than the others. Finally, we present one particular value of the family, new in the literature, which delivers balanced payoffs and characterize it by two additional properties.
Introduction
Cooperative game theory provides valuable tools to examine multi-agent interactive situations. The classic model of games with transferable utility has been thoroughly studied and today it is a theory with solid foundations. It has been widely applied to economic, social, or political problems binding the gap between these fields and mathematics. In particular, it has endowed social sciences with a formal framework in which meaningful statements can be done. One of the main research questions is how to distribute the gains obtained by a given group of agents. In this regard, the Shapley value Shapley (1953) is probably the most popular solution. It is defined as the average contribution of a player to its predecessors in a permutation and supported by appealing axiomatic characterizations. Most of the contributions in the literature overlook a key fact in today's globally interconnected societies, decisions within a group of agents can affect the outcomes of other groups of agents. Thrall and Lucas (1963) devised the partition function to incorporate coalitional externalities to the classic cooperative games.
The generalization of the Shapley value to games with externalities has attracted the attention of many scholars. Myerson (1977) was the first to tackle this question by using an axiomatic approach. Some years later, Myerson's value was criticized for not satisfying reasonable monotonicity properties and Bolger (1989) proposed another value by adapting Shapley's original axioms in a different way. Lately, several families of values that generalize the Shapley value to games with externalities have been introduced. Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) used an average approach to build their family, which also contains the value proposed by Albizuri et al. (2005) . Dutta et al. (2010) followed the potential approach to define another family that contains the previous one. In Skibski et al. (2018) an even wider family of values is proposed and characterized. All these generalizations are efficient, symmetric, and linear values. Sánchez-Pérez (2015) characterized this wider family of values. Finally, we would like to mention two remarkable generalizations of the Shapley value introduced by de Clippel and Serrano (2008) and McQuillin (2009) . Even if the approach and characterization results in the two papers are completely independent, the resulting values are in some sense complementary to each other, and they serve us for illustration purposes.
The reason for having so many different generalizations of the Shapley value is the non trivial task of generalizing the concept of the contribution of a player to a coalition. Indeed, when a player leaves a coalition it could either remain alone or join another coalition in the structure. The contribution of a player to a coalition is also the main ingredient of the null player concept. Therefore, from an axiomatic perspective, the way to generalize the null player property is an important difference between the values that can be found in the literature. On the one hand, a weak null player does not affect the worth of any coalition when he leaves it to remain alone. On the other hand, a strong null player does not affect the worth of any coalition by leaving it to either stand alone or join another existing coalition. The properties that correspond to these two notions of null player have been used in the characterization results of Bolger (1989) ; Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) ; de Clippel and Serrano (2008) ; McQuillin (2009) , and Skibski et al. (2018) , among others. Note that, the null player property is not the only distinguishing property of the existing characterization results which also involve different versions of symmetry, marginality, and consistency properties, for instance.
Here we introduce a new family of values, the so-called lattice structure values (LSvalues) , following a different approach to define what the contribution of a player is in a game with externalities. In the classic case, a contribution is based on the movement of a player that joins a coalition and corresponds to a link in the Boolean lattice of subsets.
In games with externalities the focus is on embedded coalitions which consist of a coalition and a partition of the complementary coalition. In Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) we saw that the set of embedded coalitions, EC N , has a (no Boolean) lattice structure when endowed with the partial order , defined therein. 1 Then, we consider that each link in this lattice generates a contribution that could be used to compute a value. However, in this case more than one player could be involved in the change of the embedded coalition. Basically, it could be that a player moves from being alone to joining the active coalition or it could also be that an inactive coalition splits into two new ones. The family of values is parametrized by certain weights that are used to distribute the contributions in which several players are involved. We show that the family of values studied in Skibski et al. (2018) are instances of 1 Grabisch (2010) was the first to study a partial order over EC N . Using that partial order Grabisch and Funaki (2012) defined several families of values that are not related to ours.
LS-values which are in turn contained in the class of values studied by Sánchez-Pérez (2015) .
We deliver an axiomatic characterization of the family of LS-values by means of efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and a new version of the null player property which is weaker than the two ones described above. Taking into account the way in which we define contributions, we consider that a player is null only if he is never involved in a movement that creates a non-null contribution. We show that if a game with externalities has a player of this type, then the game is actually a classic cooperative game. The basis of the set of games with externalities proposed by de Clippel and Serrano (2008) and the coefficients of any game in this basis -equivalent ot the classic Harsanyi dividends-obtained in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) play a relevant role in our results and their exposition. Finally, we single out a particular LS-value, the so-called covering value, that is new in the literature and gives rise to balanced payoffs in unanimity games. We also provide a specific characterization of the covering value by means of two proportionality properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and previous results that we will build upon. Section 3 presents the new family of values and relate it to other remarkable values in the literature. Section 4 is devoted to the axiomatization of the family of values. Before that we explain what are contributions in this setting and introduce the new null player property. The covering value and its characterization is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries

Cooperative games
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v) where N is a finite set and v : 2 N → R is a function with v (∅) = 0. The elements of N = {1, 2, . . . , n} are called players, the subsets S ⊆ N coalitions, v is the characteristic function, and v (S) is the worth of S in the game. For a given N we denote by G N the family of these games with set of players N . We may omit the reference to the set of players and only write it explicitly in
The unanimity game of coalition T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is denoted by u T and defined for every S ⊆ N by u T (S) = 1, if T ⊆ S and u T (S) = 0, otherwise. Unanimity games constitute a basis of the vector space G N . Indeed, every game v can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games as follows
The coefficients of the above combination, ∆ v T , for all non-empty coalition T ⊆ N , are called Harsanyi dividends Harsanyi (1963) of the game. They satisfy
A value on G N assigns to each game v ∈ G N a payoff vector in R N , where each component represents the payment to a player according to his cooperation possibilities. The Shapley value Shapley (1953) of a game v ∈ G N is defined for any player i ∈ N by
where
This value is the only one satisfying the axioms below. Let Θ N be the set of permutations
Partitions and embedded coalitions
Let Π N denote the set of partitions of a finite set N . 2 Let P, Q ∈ Π N , we say that P is finer than Q and write P Q if for all S ∈ P there is T ∈ Q such that S ⊆ T . We write
The top of this poset is N = {N } and the bottom N = {{i} : i ∈ N }. If P Q and
where m q is the number of subsets in which S q is divided in P .
If P ∈ Π N and Q ⊆ P then
An embedded coalition is a pair (S; P ) where S ⊆ N and P ∈ Π N \S , namely a coalition and a partition of the complementary coalition (we call groups to the subsets in P ). We denote by EC N the set of all embedded coalitions of a finite set N . (S; P ) ∈ EC N with S = ∅ and P ∈ Π N is called empty embedded coalition. EC N 0 denotes the set of all non-empty embedded coalitions of a finite set N .
Games with externalities
A game with externalities is a pair (N, v) consisting of a finite set of players N and a partition function v : EC N → R, satisfying v(∅; P ) = 0. Again, we may omit the reference to the player set and only write it explicitly when it is different from N . The amount v(S; P ) should be understood as the utility or worth that coalition S obtains when the group structure P Aumann and Dreze (1974) emerges in N \ S. From now on, we name classic games those games defined in Subsection 2.1. We denote by G N the set of games with externalities with player set N . G N is a vector space with the sum and scalar product of functions. For every (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 , the unanimity game of (the embedded coalition) (T ; Q)
2 By an abuse of notation, we use ∅ to denote the only partition in Π ∅ .
is defined by
for all (S; P ) ∈ EC N . It is easy to notice that u (S;P ) is a game with negative externalities Hafalir (2007) as other coalitions becoming larger may cause a decrease in the worth of a coalition. Note that the name of the above games is chosen deliberately for the parallelism that exists between them and the basis of classic cooperative games. Indeed, for every T ⊆ N ,
is a basis of the vector space G N de Clippel and Serrano (2008) .
There are several values in the literature that extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (see for instance, Myerson, 1977; Bolger, 1989; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007; de Clippel and Serrano, 2008; McQuillin, 2009; Skibski et al., 2018) . All of them satisfy the logical extension of the first three axioms (S1), (S2), and (S3) that we describe below. If θ ∈ Θ N , then for each v ∈ G N we define the game
Sánchez-Pérez (2015) analyzed and characterized all the values on G N that satisfy the above axioms. However, the notion of a null player has been extended in several ways and there are different corresponding properties (see for instance, Dutta et al., 2010) . We present them explicitly and elaborate on this point in Section 4.
The family of LS-values
From the definition of a unanimity game with externalities we can infer a binary relation, , among embedded coalitions. Let (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N , we say that (T ; Q) is contained in (S; P ) and write (T ; Q) (S; P ) if and only if u (T ;Q) (S; P ) = 1. We write (T ; Q) < (S; P ) if (T ; Q) (S; P ) and (T ; Q) = (S; P ). In Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) the lattice structure of the poset EC N , is thoroughly studied 4 . Figure 1 depicts the Hasse diagram of this poset of embedded coalitions for three players. In that paper, the coefficients of any game
in the basis of unanimity games are obtained explicitly. Below, we adjust Proposition 12
in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) to the structure with all the embedded coalitions (also the empty ones).
Following Harsanyi (1963) , we call dividends to the coefficients δ v (T ;Q) in the above proposition. These coefficients can also be obtained from a recursive procedure, as it is the case for the dividends of a classic game. 4 In that paper all the empty embedded coalitions are taken as only one in the structure.
Lemma 2. Let v ∈ G
N be a game with externalities.
Proof. From Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) we known that for each (T ;
where µ is the Möbius function of the poset (EC N , ). Hence, the Möbius inversion formula (see for instance Stanley, 2011 ) means that
Assuming linearity as a desirable condition for a value we can introduce a new family of values taking into account Proposition 1. We only need to define the outcome for the unanimity games defined in Equation (4). Let N be a finite set with |N | = n.
Definition 1. A number with externalities for n is a tuple, t; r
, satisfying
The interior of the number is t, the externalities are r 1 , . . . , r p and their multiplicities are λ 1 , . . . , λ p . Besides, (n; 0) is considered a number with externalities (actually the number without externalities). The set of numbers with externalities for n is denoted by E n .
In a number with externalities we do not write the multiplicity if it is one. For instance, if n = 4 then E 4 = {(4; 0), (3; 1), (2; 2), 2; 1 2 , (1; 3), (1; 1, 2), 1; 1 3 }.
So, we can define the cardinality of a non-empty embedded coalition using a number with externalities.
Definition 2. The cardinality of a non-empty embedded coalition (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 is defined by
where Q consists of λ k groups of cardinality r k for all k = 1, . . . , p. In particular, |N ; ∅| = (n; 0).
The next definition introduces coefficients to allocate the worth in a unanimity game.
Definition 3. A unanimity function over E n is a vectorial mapping α satisfying for all
The set of unanimity functions is denoted by F N .
We give now our family of values inspired by Proposition 1 and Equation (3). For any u (T ;Q) with (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 , a family of unanimity coefficients determines the influence of each group depending on the position in (T ; Q). Observe that coalition T needs that N \ T sorts out in Q to get the profit. So, α 0 (|T ; Q|) can be understood as an importance index about the formation of coalition T and α r (|T ; Q|) an importance index about the formation of each group R ∈ Q with |R| = r for separating and forming Q. Assuming that cooperation is desirable and that coalitions compete for a limited resource, the worst situation for T is the alliance of all the players in N \ T , thus it is sensible to assume that α 1 (|T ; N \ T |) = 0.
The third is a normalization condition.
Let α ∈ F N and (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 with |T ; Q| = (t; r λ 1 1 , . . . , r λp p ). If i ∈ T , we take k(i) = 0 and |T ; Q| i = t. For each i ∈ R ∈ Q, we take k(i) ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that |R| = r k(i) and
Definition 4. Let α ∈ F N . The lattice structure value associated with α, LS α , is defined as the linear extension of the value defined for unanimity games by
for all (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 and i ∈ N . The family of LS-values is the set {LS α : α ∈ F N }.
These solutions can be seen as the application of the Shapley value to a particular classic cooperative game. The next proposition helps to understand better the meaning of the unanimity functions. The proof follows from Equation (3) and the linearity of the Shapley value.
Proposition 3. Let α ∈ F N be a unanimity function. The LS-value associated with α satisfies for each (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 with |T ; Q| = (t; r
A game v ∈ G N is said to be without externalities if v(S; P ) = v(S; Q) for all (S; P ), (S; Q) ∈ EC N . Each game without externalities v is associated with a classic game
Note that we can consider that classic games are contained in the set of games with externalities. Next proposition states that any LS-value coincides with the Shapley value when the game is without externalities.
Proof. Let v be a game without externalities and α ∈ F N . First, we claim that
We proceed by a double induction: in the cardinality of T and in the cardinality of Q. First, we take the base case defined by |T | = 1 and |Q| = 1. If T = {i},
Now, let us take Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) with |Q| = 2. Let us assume Q = {T 1 , T 2 }. We get
Suppose the claim is true for all ({i}; Q) with 1 < |Q| < m < n − 1. We prove the equality when |Q| = m. Following Lemma 2,
Now suppose the claim is true for all (T ; Q) with 1 ≤ |T | < t ≤ n and all Q ∈ Π(N \ T ) .
We prove the equality when |T | = t and |Q| = 1. By Lemma 2, the induction hypothesis, and Equation (2)
Suppose the claim is true for all (T ; Q) with |T | = t and 1 < |Q| < m < n − 1. Consider (T ; Q) with |Q| = m. Again by Lemma 2, the induction hypothesis, and Equation (2),
Thus, we prove the claim.
Second, it remains to show LS α (v) = φ(v). From Proposition 3 and the concept of a unanimity function we get for all
Finally, using the Equations (1), (5), (7), and (8) we have
and that concludes the proof.
Next, we show that some of the known values in the literature are instances of LS-values and we also introduce a new one. 
Let (T ; Q) ∈ EC
N 0 and u (T ;Q) the unanimity game of (T ; Q). First, we claim that
If S N then (T ; Q) (S; N \ S ) if and only if there exists R 0 ∈ Q with N \ S ⊆ R 0 (namely, N \ R 0 ⊆ S). Moreover, as Q is a partition, R 0 is unique. We obtain
It follows immediately that if (T ; Q) (S; N \ S ) then u * * (T ;Q) (S) = 0.
If S = N , clearly (T ; Q) (N ; ∅) and N \ R ⊆ N for any R ∈ Q. Thus,
In particular, if |Q| = 1, then u * * (T ;Q) = u T . Second, we check that f q is also a LS α value. If i ∈ T then i ∈ N \ R for any R and
Using the linearity of the Shapley value, Equation (3), and Equation (9), we get
Observe that if |T ; Q| = (t; r 
and if k 0 ∈ {1, . . . , p}
Also α(t; n − t) = (1, 0). Obviously, we have f q = LS α . In order to prove that α is a unanimity function, we only need to see the third condition in the definition. Suppose (t; r λ 1 , . . . , r λp p ) ∈ E n with p > 1. We have
By Condition 3 of Definition 1,
Example 3. The modified egalitarian solution is a value on G N defined by taking α(t; r
for all (t; r λ 1 1 , . . . , r λp p ) ∈ E n . Obviously, it is easy to check that α is a unanimity function. Following Definition 4, the LS-value associated to this unanimity function is given by the linear extension of
for every (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 . Fixed the unanimity game of an embedded coalition (T ; Q). On one hand, f me assigns the same amount for all the players, into or out the coalition T when |Q| > 1, and on the other hand, f me only gives the same non-null amount to players in T when |Q| = 1.
Axiomatization of the family of LS-values
We introduce a new concept of contribution for a player in a game with externalities. In the classic theory a contribution can be identified with a link in the Boolean algebra 2 N .
Our approach uses the lattice structure (see Figure 1 ) of the set of embedded coalitions, (EC N , ). The links in this lattice can be considered an indivisible step in the formation of an embedded coalition and its associated worth. Links can be of two types: a player joins a coalition or a group is divided in two. Accordingly, there are two types of contributions.
Each link represents a cover relation in the partial order. Let (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N be two embedded coalitions, (T ; Q) covers (S; P ) in (EC N , ) if one of these facts happens, a) there exists i ∈ T with S = T \ {i} and P = Q + {i} , or b) S = T and there are two different groups T 1 , T 2 ∈ Q with P = Q −{T 1 ,T 2 }+ T 1 ∪T 2 Definition 5. Let v ∈ G N be a game. The contribution when (T ; Q) covers (S; P ) in v is defined by v(T ; Q) − v(S; P ).
In the classic theory, the contribution is marginal for a player because each link represents a player joining a coalition. Now, there can be several players involved in a contribution.
We consider a player active in a link if his affiliation changes between its two endpoints.
Definition 6. Let (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N be two embedded coalitions such that (T ; Q) covers (S; P ). A player i ∈ N is active in the link, and it is denoted by (S; P ) i (T ; Q), if
The contributions of the first type, are called marginal because each of them is attributed to only one player. They are parallel to the marginal contributions in classic games. But now we also have contributions of a second type that we call external. The concept of null player is strongly connected to the idea of a contribution. Two of the most used definitions of null player are the following (see de Clippel and Serrano, 2008; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007) . A player i is a weak null player in v ∈ G N if for all (S; P ) ∈ EC N with i ∈ S it holds v(S \ {i}; P + {i} ) = v(S; P ). A player i is a strong null player in v ∈ G N if for all (S; P ) ∈ EC N with i ∈ S and T ∈ P ∪ {∅} it holds v(S \ {i}; P − T + T ∪{i} ) = v(S; P ).
Obviously any strong null player is also a weak null player. Both concepts do not take into account the external contributions. Now we introduce a new notion of null player using both types of contributions.
Definition 7. Let v ∈ G N be a game with externalities. A player i ∈ N is a complete null player in v if v(S; P ) = v(T ; Q) for every (S; P ), (T ; Q) ∈ EC N with (T ; Q) covers (S; P ) and (S; P ) i (T ; Q).
A complete null player has all his contributions null, namely in all the embedded coalitions the contributions with this player active are null. All the complete null players are also strong null players but not vice-versa. The next example shows a game with externalities that illustrates the previous concepts and has a strong null player who is not a complete null player. The embedded coalition ({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) covers ({4}; {{1, 2, 3}. Now, players 1, 2, and 3 are the active players in the link. In this case, the associated external contribution is v({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) − v({4}; {1, 2, 3}) = 1 − 0 = 1.
We check that player 3 is a strong null player. Let (S; P ) ∈ EC N with 3 ∈ S. It holds that if (S; P ) = ({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}}), then v(S; P ) = v(S \ {3}; Q) = 0 where Q is any partition of the form Q = P − T + T ∪{3} for any T ∈ P or Q = P + {3} . If (S; P ) = ({3, 4}; {{1}, {2}}), then v(S; P ) = v({4}; {{1}, {2}, {3}}) = v({4}; {{1, 3}, {2}}) = v({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) = 1.
Thus, we prove that player 3 is a strong null player. But player 3 is not a complete null player because v({4}; {{1}, {2, 3}}) = 1 and v({4}; {1, 2, 3}) = 0.
Recall that a game without externalities is a game v ∈ G N satisfying v(S; P ) = v(S; Q) for all (S; P ), (S; Q) ∈ EC N and that it can be considered equivalent to a classic one. Indeed, if v ∈ G N is a game without externalities then the classic game associated to it (see Equation 6) is defined by w v (S) = v(S; P ) for any P ∈ Π N \S . Next, we prove that if there is a complete null player in a game with externalities then the game is equivalent to a classic game.
Proposition 5. Let v ∈ G N . If there exists a complete null player in v, then v is a game without externalities. Moreover, this player is a null player in
Proof. Consider that i ∈ N is a complete null player in the game v ∈ G N . Let (S; P ) ∈ EC N be an embedded coalition. We show that v(S; P ) = v(S; N \ S ) .
Suppose first that i / ∈ S. We proceed by induction on |P |. Obviously the result is true when |P | = 1. If |P | = 2 then the result follows from the concept of complete null player
. Now, assuming that the result is true when |P | = k − 1 we prove it for |P | = k.
Let T 1 , T 2 ∈ P with i ∈ T 1 ∪ T 2 . Then,
where the first equality follows from the definition of complete null player and the second one by the induction hypothesis. Then, v(S; P ) = v(S; N \ S ) .
Secondly, suppose that i ∈ S. The definition of complete null player and the above result imply v(S; P ) = v(S\{i}; P + {i} ) = v(S\{i}; N \S∪{i} ) = v(S\{i}; {N \S, {i}}) = v(S; N \S ).
Finally, we show that player i is a null player in w v . Let S ⊆ N with i ∈ S andP ∈ Π N \S .
Then,
that is, player i is null player in w v and we conclude the proof.
Sánchez-Pérez (2015) Clearly, (SE4a) implies (SE4b) and (SE4b) implies (SE4c). Next, we show that every LS-value satisfies the axioms.
Theorem 6. All LS-values satisfy linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3), and the complete null player property (SE4c).
Proof. Consider the LS α -value with α ∈ F N . We check that it satisfies each axiom.
Linearity. It follows directly from Definition 4.
Efficiency. Taken a game v ∈ G N , Lemma 2 implies
Since the linearity of the LS-values and Proposition 1 we have
Taking into account the definition of a unanimity function, we obtain for each (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 with |T ; Q| = (t; r
Symmetry. Consider θ ∈ Θ N and (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 . Note that θu (T ;Q) = u (θT ;θQ) . In fact, θu (T ;Q) (S; P ) = u (T ;Q) (θ −1 S; θ −1 P ) and then θu (T ;Q) (S;
namely (θT ; θQ) (S; P ), and θu (T ;Q) (S; P ) = 0 otherwise. But |T ; Q| = |θT ; θQ| and so we obtain LS From Lemma 2 we get the equality by induction for all the embedded coalitions. So, by the linearity of the value,
Complete null player property. Suppose there exists a complete null player i ∈ N in v ∈ G N . Proposition 5 implies that v is a game without externalities and that player i is a null player in w v . As the Shapley value satisfies the null player property, then Proposition 4
The next theorem shows that the only values satisfying these axioms are LS-values.
Theorem 7. If a value on G N satisfies linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3), and complete null player property (SE4c), then it is a LS-value.
Proof. Let f be a value on G N satisfying the axioms. By linearity we only need to find a unanimity function α such that for all i ∈ N and (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 ,
Let t; r . We take for
being i ∈ T ∈ Q with |T | = r k . Besides, we consider
with i ∈ T and |T | = t. Symmetry of f guarantees that α is well defined, because the payoff is the same for all the players in groups with the same size for all the embedded coalitions of a given cardinality. Obviously, the function α satisfies the required equality, thus we focus on checking that α is a unanimity function. By definition α t; r ∈ E n . Let (t; n − t) with t > 0. We have
with |T | = t and i / ∈ T . Since i is a complete null player in u (T ; N \T ) and f satisfies the complete null player property, we obtain α 1 (t; n − t) = 0. Now fixed (t; r 
Thus, we finish the proof.
Notice that Equation (10) provides a method to obtain the unanimity function associated to a LS-value. Sánchez-Pérez (2015) described the family of all values on G N that satisfy (SE1), (SE2), and (SE3). Thus, the LS-values are instances of that family, but not all the values satisfying these three axioms satisfy the complete null player property. For instance, the egalitarian value, defined by
for all i ∈ N and v ∈ G N . Since (SE4b) implies (SE4c), then all the values on G N studied by Skibski et al. (2018) are LS-values. But there exist LS-values which do not belong to that family as we see in the next Section.
The covering value
In this section we introduce a particular LS-value. Each value in our family is determined by the definition of payoffs for unanimity games, which are in turn specified by unanimity functions. Next, we will describe a way to share the unit of worth in the unanimity game of the embedded coalition (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 . We follow an interpretation of the formula of the Shapley value for the classic unanimity games (Equation (3)). Consider a classic unanimity game u T for a non-empty coalition T ⊆ N . The Shapley value shares the unit of worth equally among the contributions to this coalition. We have |T | contributions, in each of them the contribution is marginal for a different player of T . Hence, the payoff to a player is the probability of being an active player in a contribution. We extend this idea to unanimity games with externalities, taking into account our considerations on what a contribution for a player is. First, we calculate the number of contributions to a particular embedded coalition. Proof. There is one for each player in coalition T of the form (T \ {i}; Q + {i} ). Furthermore, we have one for each union of two different groups of Q, (T ; Q −{S,R}+ S∪R ) , and there are as many as |Q|(|Q| − 1) 2 of them.
According to Proposition 8, if we take (T ; Q) ∈ EC
N 0 with |Q| = 1, then cov(T ; Q) = |T |. We understand an embedded coalition (T ; Q) as a coalition T which obtains certain payoff depending on the structure of groups formed in the external side of the coalition, in N \ T . Now we take any embedded coalition (S; P ) covered by (T ; Q). If (S; P ) produces a marginal contribution, namely S = T \ {i} for certain i ∈ T , then we consider the contribution only as a payoff for this player i. If (S; P ) generates an external contribution, namely S = T , then we consider the contribution as a payoff not only to the active players in the link, all of them out of T , but also to the players in the coalition T . We include players in coalition T because they form the coalition that generates the worth. So, we assign to each player in T a marginal contribution and a part of each external contribution, and we assign to a player not in T a part of those external contributions in which he is active in the link.
Definition 8. The covering value is the linear extension of the function defined by
Next we show that the covering value is an instance of the family of LS-values.
Proposition 9. The covering value is a LS-value.
Proof. Let t; r 
We compute the payoff vectors given by f cs and f q , defined in Example 1 and Example 2, respectively. Notice that
Thus,
Proposition 9 guarantees that the covering value satisfies linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3), and complete null player (SE4c). We propose now properties that pin down the covering value. We follow the idea of hierarchical power of Faigle and Kern (1992) in the sense that we propose certain proportionality between the payoffs in a unanimity game and the measure of power for an embedded coalition. Let (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 be an embedded coalition. The power in this embedded coalition is measured by two levels: the activity level |T | |T | + |R| and the splitting level of (T ; Q)
The splitting level can be divided among the groups of the partition as follows. For each
Observe that spl (T ;Q) = 0 if and only if |Q| = 1. Additionally,
and act (T ;Q) + spl (T ;Q) = cov(T ; Q).
In the following we propose two new properties based on these measures in order to charac-terize the covering value. Let f be a value on G N .
(SE5) Proportionality on activity versus splitting. For every embedded coalition (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 , spl
To conclude this Section, we characterize the covering value in the next result.
Theorem 10. The covering value κ is the only value on G N satisfying linearity (SE1), efficiency (SE2), symmetry (SE3), proportionality on activity versus spliting (SE5), and the partial splitting property (SE6).
Proof. Existence. In Theorem 6, we proved that all LS-values satisfy (SE1), (SE2) and (SE3). It is easy to check that the covering value κ satisfies (SE5) and (SE6).
Uniqueness. Let f be a value on G N satisfying all the axioms in the statement. By (SE1)
we only need to show uniqueness for unanimity games. Let (T ; Q) ∈ EC N 0 . Since f satisfies (SE2) and (SE5), we obtain spl (T ;Q) i∈T f i (u (T ;Q) ) = act (T ;Q) 1 − i∈T f i (u (T ;Q) ) .
Hence, i∈T f i (u (T ;Q) ) = act (T ;Q) act (T ;Q) + spl (T ;Q) .
Using (SE3), we get f i (u (T ;Q) ) = f j (u (T ;Q) ) for all i, j ∈ T . Then, for each i ∈ T we have f i (u (T ;Q) ) = act (T ;Q)
|T | (act (T ;Q) + spl (T ;Q) ) .
Applying again (SE3), f i (u (T ;Q) ) = f j (u (T ;Q) ), for all i, j ∈ S with S ∈ Q. Let i / ∈ T . If |Q| = 1, namely Q = N \ T , then (SE5) and (SE3) imply act (T ;Q) |N \ T |f i (u (T ;Q) ) = 0,
because the splitting level is spl (T ;Q) = 0. Thus, f i (u (T ;Q) ) = 0. Suppose now that |Q| > 1.
Let us take S ∈ Q with i ∈ S. Applying (SE6) we have for each S ∈ Q, S = S, j∈S f j (u (T ;Q) ) = spl But, since f j (u (T ;Q) ) is unique for all j ∈ T , then f i (u (T ;Q) ) is also unique, which finishes the proof.
In Theorem 6 we provide a characterization of the family of LS-values, using among others, the complete null player property (SE4c). Even if the covering value is an element of this family, this property is not directly included in Theorem 10. Nevertheless, notice that under symmetry, the definition of the splitting level of an embedded coalition and (SE5) imply the complete null player property (SE4c) as you can see in the proof of Theorem 10 (Equation (18)).
Conclusions
Inspired by our previous work on a lattice structure of EC N , we have built the family of LS-values which contain many of the existing generalizations of the Shapley value. As it is a broad family, it is not easy to find a closed expression for an arbitrary member. The computation in a particular game is also not a simple task as one first needs to write the game as a combination of unanimity games. However, the family of LS-values is supported by an appealing axiomatization that uses four properties that generalize the ones used by Shapley (1953) in his seminal characterization. The first three properties, efficiency, symmetry, and linearity are very standard and have been extensively used in the framework of games with externalities. The fourth one, is the main novelty of the characterization result as it is a new version of the null player property. There is quite a debate about how to generalize the classic property and we contribute to it by introducing a property which is weaker than others. Figure 2 depicts the inclusion relation among several families of values for games with externalities, identifying some values in each family.
In the future, we would like to work on related issues like methods to ease the computation of values for games with externalities. We also plan to study monotonicity or 
